Introduction
The link between seigniorage and inflation has been established and is estimated to be in the form of a Laffer curve in which the maximum amount of seigniorage occurs at a particular inflation rate and the smaller amounts of seigniorage occur at both high and low rates of inflation, presenting the dual equilibria that Bruno and Fischer analyzed in their 1990 paper "Seigniorage,
Operating Rules, and the High Inflation Trap." In that paper, Bruno and Fischer use a basic money-only model to demonstrate dual equilibria under both rational expectations and adaptive expectations.
Another important study on inflation, seigniorage, and the Laffer curve is the 1995 paper "Money Demand and Seigniorage-Maximizing Inflation" by Easterly, Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel. This work develops a model of money, inflation, and seigniorage, and then uses data from eleven high-inflation countries in the time period to calculate the theoretical seigniorage-maximizing inflation rate using several different equations and statistical methods. The seigniorage-maximizing rates they calculate range all the way from 42 percent to
infinity.
Yet another important paper on the inflation-seigniorage link is Kiguel and Neumeyer's work "Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case of Argentina," which studies the inflationary events of Argentina from 1979 to 1989. This paper finds that Argentina's revenue-maximizing inflation rates are around twenty to thirty percent per month, which are quite high.
In this paper, I will analyze the Laffer curves formed by the seigniorage and inflation relationship for twenty-nine countries in Africa. The motivation for choosing Africa is that it is a region of the world that is not often studied in economics and that the countries do exhibit economic and governmental diversity; although many of the countries are poor, several are oil-rich countries where m is the ratio of real monetary base to GDP, g y is the growth rate of real GDP, and π is inflation (69). In my paper, I shall use the Jafari-Samimi definition and scale seigniorage to GDP and not consumption. The following sections will produce preliminary results from two equations, the R = α 0 + α 1 π + α 2 π 2 equation already mentioned, and the equation without an intercept R = α 1 π + α 2 π 2 for which I will also obtain the rate of inflation that produces the most seigniorage and that maximum amount of seigniorage. By optimizing the equation using simple calculus, setting the first derivative to zero, and solving for inflation, the optimal rate of inflation (π*) is found to be equal to -α 1 /(2α 2 ). The maximum amount of seigniorage is found by plugging the optimal inflation rate back into the initial equation and is equal to -α 1 2 /(4α 2 ).
Section 2 will analyze the long-term Laffer curve for African countries by using the long-term average rates of inflation and seigniorage. Section 3 will analyze the year-by-year Laffer curves for African countries to examine the shortrun effects of inflation and seigniorage on the Laffer curve. Section 4 will use country-by-country analysis of the various Laffer curves. Section 5 will revisit the year-by-year Laffer curves using revised data based on the results of Section 4.
Section 6 will analyze all the data using various panel data techniques. Section 7 will sum up the results and conclude.
Long-term Relationship Analysis
This section uses average inflation and seigniorage rates for twenty-nine In this long-term data set, the model without the intercept looks to be quite significant (as the values for both α 1 and α 2 are both significant at one percent and have the expected sign), while the model with the intercept appears to be only slightly significant (as the value for α 1 is significant at five percent, but all coefficients have the expected signs). As for how the data from the model without the intercept compare with the optimal inflation rate and the theoretical maximum rate of seigniorage, three out of the twenty-nine countries (Algeria, Egypt, and Sierra Leone) have average seigniorage rates that are actually higher than the theoretical predicted maximum and one country (Sierra Leone) has an average inflation rate that is higher than the optimum.
Year-by-year Relationship Analysis
This section analyzes year-by-year data to check the short-term relationship between inflation and seigniorage. The years I am using are 1981 through 2005. 3.09*** 5.65*** 2.25** 5.28*** 3.02*** 6.86*** α 2 (value) -0.000402 -0.00093155 -0.00103 -0.00146 -0.00050637 -0.00090876 α 2 (t-statistic) -0. For the model without the intercept, the α 1 coefficient is very significant (with 24 of the 25 values being significant at one percent with the other value being significant at five percent and with all values being positive as expected) and the α 2 coefficient being quite significant as well (with five values being significant at one percent, another five values being significant at five percent, and another four values being significant at ten percent, with all but one value
[2003] being negative as expected). The model with the intercept is much less significant, as the α 0 coefficient has three values that are significant at one percent, another two values that are significant at five percent, and another two values that are significant at ten percent, with all but one value [1990] being positive as expected. The α 1 coefficient has fourteen values that are significant at one percent, another four values that are significant at five percent, and
another three values that are significant at ten percent, with all values being positive as expected. The α 2 coefficient has only one value that is significant at one percent, another value that is significant at five percent, and another two values that are significant at ten percent, with five values [1996, 2002, 2003, 
Country-by-country Relationship Analysis
This section analyzes the relationship between inflation and seigniorage country-by-country. I am using the data from 1981 to 2005 for each country. For the model without the intercept, the α 1 coefficient is very significant (with 27 of the 29 values being significant at one percent and another value being significant at five percent and with all values being positive as expected) and the α 2 coefficient being quite significant as well (with six values being significant at one percent, another five values being significant at five percent, and another value being significant at ten percent, with all but ten values [Central African
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Swaziland] being negative as expected). The model with the intercept is much less significant, as the α 0 coefficient has seven values that are significant at one percent, another two values that are significant at five percent, and another three values that are significant at ten percent, with all but two values (Swaziland and Tanzania) being positive as expected. The α 1 coefficient has seventeen values that are significant at one percent and another four values that are significant at five percent with all but one value (Botswana) being positive as expected. The α 2 coefficient has three values that are significant at one percent, another value that is significant at five percent, and another two values that are significant at ten percent, with sixteen values being positive instead of the expected negative values. Once again, the model without the intercept looks to be quite significant (but with only nineteen of the twenty-nine countries having the correct sign for the α 2 coefficient), while the model with the intercept appears to be only slightly significant, with more than half of the α 2 coefficients having the wrong sign. As for how the data from the model without the intercept compare with the optimal inflation rate and the theoretical maximum rate of seigniorage, the nineteen countries that fit the theoretical model have a total of thirty-two instances of exceeding the theoretical maximum seigniorage rate (for an average of 1.684 instances per country and about 6.7 percent of the possible instances) and seventeen instances of exceeding the optimum inflation rate (for an average of .8947 instances per country and about 3.58 percent of the possible instances).
Year-by-Year Relationship Analysis Revised
In this section, I have redone the year-by-year analysis using only the nineteen countries that conformed to the expected results in the country-bycountry analysis and only using the model without the intercept. Once again, I am using the years 1981 through 2005, as well as calculating the long-term averages as in Section 2 of this paper. In this long-term data set, the model looks to be quite significant (as the value for α 1 is significant at one percent, the value for α 2 is significant at five percent, and both coefficients have the expected signs). As for how the data from the model without the intercept compare with the optimal inflation rate and the theoretical maximum rate of seigniorage, three out of the nineteen countries (Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania) have average seigniorage rates that are actually higher than the theoretical predicted maximum and one country (Ghana) has an average inflation rate that is higher than the optimum.
For the year-by-year analysis, the α 1 coefficient is very significant (with eighteen values being significant at one percent and another six values being significant at five percent, with all values being positive as expected) and the α 2 coefficient being significant as well (with two values being significant at one percent, another three values being significant at five percent, and another five values being significant at ten percent, with all but two values [1987 and 1990] being negative as expected). Once again, the model looks to be relatively significant, but not as significant as the year-by-year analysis done earlier in this paper. As for how the data from the model without the intercept compare with the optimal inflation rate and the theoretical maximum rate of seigniorage, the twenty-three years that fit the theoretical model have a total of thirty-seven instances of exceeding the theoretical maximum seigniorage rate (for an average of 1.61 countries per year and about 8.47 percent of possible instances) and
fourteen instances of exceeding the optimum inflation rate (for an average of .61
countries per year and about 3.2 percent of possible instances).
Panel Data Relationship Analysis
In this section, I will use various panel data methods to analyze the data;
the methods I use are the seven methods supported by SAS: one-way fixed effects, two-way fixed effects, one-way random effects, two-way random effects, the Fuller and Battese method, the Parks method, and the Da Silva method.
Each method was used with and without an intercept. Note: since the two-way random effects produces the same results as the Fuller and Battese method, the Fuller and Battese method will not be listed in the chart. 21.98*** 21.98*** 20.33*** 20.33*** 22.11*** 23.49*** α 2 (value) -0.00052 -0.00052 -0.00054 -0.00054 -0.00052 -0.00056 α 2 (t-statistic) -6.21*** -6.21*** -6.20*** -6.20*** -6.25*** -6.80*** 21.63*** 23.16*** 312.28*** 268.03*** 22.68*** 23.77*** α 2 (value) -0.00053 -0.00057 -0.00041 -0.00058 -0.00048 -0.00051 α 2 (t-statistic) -6.29*** -6.92*** -49.42*** -55.41*** -6.44*** -6.98*** All coefficient values are significant at one percent except for the intercept values for one-way and two-way fixed effects; also, all coefficient values have their expected signs. The data from all these methods are very significant. As for how the data from the model without the intercept compare with the optimal inflation rate and the theoretical maximum rate of seigniorage, there are no values of inflation higher than the optimal rates of any of the panel data methods, and there are only four instances (out of a possible 725) of seigniorage that are higher than the lowest maximum rate of seigniorage set by any of the panel data methods.
Summary and Conclusions
In summary, the results show that the model without the intercept is quite significant, while the model with the intercept appears to be only slightly significant. Jafari-Simimi concludes that the lack of an intercept implies that seigniorage comes from the inflation tax alone and that the few instances of inflation higher than the optimal rate imply that governments do not try to maximize revenue through the inflation tax (75). I agree with his conclusions.
My conclusion is that the Laffer curve does hold in the model without an intercept, as demonstrated by the multiple data sets and methods used to analyze them. Table 6 . Data (INF = Inflation, R = Seigniorage) Country 1981 INF 1981 R 1982 INF 1982 R 1983 INF 1983 R 1984 INF 1984 1985 R 1986 INF 1986 R 1987 INF 1987 R 1988 INF 1988 1989 R 1990 INF 1990 R 1991 INF 1991 R 1992 INF 1992 
